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1 Introduction
There is little doubt that citizens face an uncertain political world. It is diÆcult to make
predictions about the possible behavior of politicians in the future (Downs 1957). Candi-
dates and public gures often have incentives to present ambiguous or vague information
to the public (Shepsle 1972, Page 1978). Further, the mass media presents political infor-
mation to the public in short \spots", which focus more on the \horserace" of candidate
competition than on substantive politics (Patterson 1980). All of this ensures that the
average citizen nds political information very costly to obtain and that the information
they can obtain is not necessarily accurate.
Recently, some scholars have focused attention on the role of uncertainty in elections
(Alvarez 1997, Bartels 1986, Franklin 1991). They reveal that there is a great deal of
uncertainty about the issue positions of candidates, and thus the costs of issue voting are
burdensome for the average citizen. Further, this uncertainty aects how voters evaluate
candidates in two ways. First, voters are less likely to evaluate a candidate in terms of
an issue when they are uncertain about the candidate's position on that issue. Second,
uncertainty about candidate issue positions has a negative impact on voter evaluations
of a candidate. Thus uncertainty about candidate issue positions means that voters are
unable to evaluate candidates on the basis of their issue positions, and tend to dislike
candidates who's issue positions are uncertain.
Given the high level of uncertainty about the issue positions of candidates, many
have speculated that voters instead rely on non{issue information to make their candi-
date evaluations (Popkin 1991, Alvarez 1997). These political scientists contend that
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voters rely, among other things, on information about the personality traits of the can-
didates to supplement costly issue information when determining candidate preference.
From the perceived personality traits of a candidate voters can infer the credibility of
the candidate (how likely it is that he or she will pursue policies promised during the
campaign), as well as the ability of the candidate to deal with future issues unforeseen
during the campaign. For these reasons many political scientists feel that information
about candidate personality traits plays a large role in evaluations of candidates.
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This conclusion is based upon a number of studies which have shown that candidate
trait evaluations are very strong predictors of vote choice in American national elections
(Kinder 1986, Markus 1982, Miller 1990, Miller et al. 1986) as well as in European
democratic elections (Bean 1993, Bean and Mughan 1989, Stewart and Clarke 1992).
What is not as clear from the literature, though, is whether some traits might matter
more than others in determining voter choice (Funk 1997), and whether there voter
expertise or information play any role in determining whether some voters are more able
to use trait information than others (Funk 1997, Rahn et al. 1990).
It is important to realize that for most individuals, information about the personality
traits of candidates comes from the same sources as information about the issue positions
of the candidates, generally media outlets. This means that information about the per-
sonalities of candidates is passed through the same noisy channels as information about
their issue positions, and is thus subject to the same types of distortions and biases which
govern the ow of information about candidate issue positions. Although it is likely eas-
ier to interpret than issue information, trait information is still subject to uncertainty.
Further, if candidates have incentives to distort their issue positions in order to appeal
to as many voters as possible, they should also have the incentive to distort information
about their personality or leadership traits in ways designed to appeal to voters as well.
Thus, even the very type of information which many scholars regard as an alternative
to high cost issue information is only obtained at some price to the individual, and is
likely to be inaccurate, resulting in voter uncertainty about the personality traits as well
as the issue positions of candidates. As voter uncertainty about the issue positions of a
candidate has been shown to have a negative impact on their evaluation of that candidate
and reduce the use of issues in determining candidate preference, it seems reasonable to
expect that uncertainty about the personality traits of a candidate would have a similar
eect. That is, we expect uncertainty about a candidate's personality traits to (1) reduce
the use of opinions about that candidate's traits in evaluations of that candidate, and
(2) reduce the overall evaluations of that candidate.
The goal of this paper is to examine this uncertainty and its eects using new survey
questions designed to elicit respondent uncertainty about candidate evaluations. The
remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces and examines
the measures of opinions about candidate traits and certainty about those traits. We are
particularly interested in establishing the validity of the direct measure of uncertainty
used in this paper. Section 3 then examines the eect of trait opinions on candidate
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evaluations, and tests the eect that uncertainty about those opinions has on the use of
traits in an evaluation. Section 4 concludes.
2 Measuring Uncertainty About Candidate Traits
Despite a recent trend towards examining the empirical signicance of uncertain infor-
mation in American politics, no consensus has emerged as to how to best measure uncer-
tainty in the electorate. One of two general methods has been used in the past to measure
uncertainty in surveys; indirect measures of uncertainty, which infer the uncertainty of
survey respondents through other information on the survey, and direct measures of un-
certainty, where respondents are invited to state how certain they feel about various
survey answers they provide. We discuss each in turn.
Indirect measures of uncertainty take one of two forms. Either researchers employ an
objective measure of uncertainty by examining the dierence between respondent answers
to survey questions and the \correct" answer to the question (Alvarez 1997), or they use
a statistical model which estimates respondent uncertainty from demographic character-
istics of the respondent (Bartels 1986, Franklin 1991). Although it is the respondent's
subjective uncertainty that is predicted to aect voting behavior, objectivemeasures of un-
certainty are often good approximations of subjective uncertainty (Alvarez 1997). These
methods can be applied to a wide range of surveys, but each requires strict assumptions
about how respondents answer survey questions that often prove problematic (Alvarez
1997). Estimating respondent uncertainty through the demographic characteristics of a
respondent requires that the relationship between these characteristics and uncertainty
be known, otherwise the misspecication of the model will result in inaccurate estimates
of respondent uncertainty. Estimating uncertainty by the dierence between the \cor-
rect" answer to a survey question and a respondent's answer requires that the researcher
know the \correct" answer, and that all respondents use the survey question in the same
way.
In contrast to the indirect measures of uncertainty, direct survey questions about
uncertainty capture a respondent's subjective uncertainty. Further, direct measures of
uncertainty are not hampered by the assumptions required by the indirect measures.
Thus, the establishment of a direct measure of uncertainty in surveys merits some ef-
fort. Unfortunately, experience with other direct measures in surveys have often been
negative.
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. Direct measures of issue salience have often proven to be unreliable (Niemi
and Bartels 1985), and experimental subjects often prove to be poor reporters of their
own decision making processes (Nesbett and Wilson 1977). Thus, an eort must be made
to establish the validity of the direct measure of uncertainty employed in this paper. In
previous work, Alvarez and Franklin (1994) developed and examined a series of survey
questions which probe a respondent's certainty about their own position and the posi-
tions of various political gures on standard seven-point issue scales.
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They conclude
that these certainty questions are an accurate measure of how well informed survey re-
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spondents are about their own positions and the positions of candidates on issue scales.
In the remainder of this section we will verify that such direct measures of certainty
are meaningful when applied to candidate traits, as has already been established for
candidate issue positions.
In two recent National Election Studies certainty questions have been asked of re-
spondents about their evaluations of the leadership and morality of Clinton and Dole
(1995 NES Pilot) and of the same traits for Clinton, Dole and Perot (1996 NES).
4
These
certainty questions all have exactly the same wording. For example, in the 1996 NES
study, respondents were rst asked about Clinton's morality: \Think about Bill Clinton.
In your opinion does the phrase `he is moral' describe Bill Clinton extremely well, quite
well, not too well, or not well at all?" Then, all of the respondents who answered that
were asked about their certainty of this opinion with the following question: \How certain
are you about this? Very certain, pretty certain, or not very certain?" The responses
to the latter question are what we call the individual's certainty about the particular
candidate trait.
We begin our analysis of the response to these certainty questions by examining the
response marginals for the 1995 and 1996 NES data. The survey response marginals are
given in Tables 1 (1995) and 2 (1996). Each table presents the responses to the certainty
questions for each candidate.
Tables 1 and 2 go here
Beginning with the results from the 1995 NES study, we see that there is considerable
certainty for Clinton's trait evaluations. Roughly one{third of the sample stated they
were \very certain" of their evaluation of Clinton's leadership and morality. Only about
11% of the sample said they were \not very certain" about either of Clinton's traits.
On the other hand, the results for Dole show that slightly fewer respondents were very
certain of whether Dole was a strong leader (23%), while just under one{third of the
sample were very certain of Dole's morality. These results demonstrate that there was
a good deal of heterogeneity in how certain survey respondents in 1995 felt about their
evaluations of both Clinton and Dole's leadership and morality. Although respondents
were more certain of their evaluation of the incumbent's traits than of the challenger's
it is clear that most respondents in this survey sample did not feel perfectly informed in
their evaluations of candidate traits.
In Table 2 we present the survey response marginals for Clinton, Dole and Perot from
the 1996 NES study. Here, instead of asking the certainty question for the trait \provides
strong leadership", the certainty question was posed for the closely{related trait \gets
things done." Beginning with Clinton, in 1996 we see that 27% of the respondents were
very certain in their opinion about whether Clinton \gets things done", while almost 15%
were not very certain whether Clinton \gets things done." Respondents were somewhat
less certain in their assessments of Dole's abilities to \get things done" since 21% were
4
very certain and 23% were not very certain. Also, respondents were virtually as certain
of their assessments of Perot's ability to \get things done" as they were of Dole. But
respondents were quite uncertain about Perot's morality; only 17% were very certain
about their evaluation of this trait for Perot and 30% were not very certain. The response
marginals in 1996 exhibit similar patterns to those in 1995, with respondents feeling most
sure about their evaluations of the incumbent Clinton, and somewhat less sure of their
evaluations of the challengers Dole and Perot.
It is also worth noticing that the item nonresponse relating to these survey questions
is extremely low. This is exactly what previous research has found regarding item non-
response for certainty about issue placements (Alvarez and Franklin 1994); both these
results in previous work and in this analysis demonstrate that survey respondents seem
to understand and to be quite willing to answer these survey questions.
The survey marginals for these candidate trait certainty questions indicate that there
is a great deal of heterogeneity between survey respondents in how certain they are
of candidate traits. Additionally, we have shown that respondents are somewhat more
certain of the traits of the sitting incumbent president relative to his two competitors,
and that there was a great deal of uncertainty about at least one trait for the non{major
party presidential candidate (Perot) in 1996. At rst glance the direct measurement of
certainty appears to yield sensible estimates of the type and level of uncertainty in the
electorate.
However, we obviously must do more to examine the validity of these survey questions.
One of the major arguments in the literature on voter uncertainty about candidate traits
is that those individuals with greater costs of information ought to be more uncertain
about the issue positions of candidates (Alvarez 1997, Alvarez and Franklin 1994, Bartels
1986, Enelow and Hinich 1984, Franklin 1991). We extend this argument to the case of
respondent uncertainty about candidate traits.
As information about candidate traits is transmitted to voters in the same way as
information about candidate issue positions, we expect that many of the same factors
that aect uncertainty about candidate issue positions will also aect uncertainty about
candidate trait attributes. Previous work on voter uncertainty has demonstrated that
as individual information costs increase, uncertainty about candidate issue positions in-
creases (Alvarez 1997, Bartels 1986). If we demonstrate a similar relationship between
indicators of information costs and responses on candidate trait uncertainty, we can be
condent that the latter survey questions indeed are tapping into individual uncertainty
about candidate traits. To do this we utilize a multivariate model to test for the empirical
relationship between information costs and candidate trait uncertainty in both the 1995
and 1996 NES studies. Since responses to the uncertainty question are trichotomous
(coded one for \very certain", two for \pretty certain", and three for \not very certain"),
we utilize an ordered probit model. To measure the information costs of respondents we
include variables for whether the individual watches the nightly television news, whether
they are a member of a minority group, their gender and educational attainment, their
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general level of chronic information, and the strength of their partisanship
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. Watching
news on television and higher levels of education are both expected to reduce the costs
of information and thus uncertainty, leading us to expect a negative coeÆcient estimate
for these variables. The coeÆcients on chronic information and strong partisanship are
also expected to be negative, as possession of these traits indicates greater interest in
the political process and thus lower costs of information. A positive coeÆcient estimate
is expected for gender and race, reecting the greater costs of information to (and thus
greater uncertainty of) these subsets of the electorate.
The results from these ordered probit models are given in Tables 3 (1995) and 4
(1996). Table 3 reports the ordered probit estimates for Clinton (strong leadership and
morality) rst, followed by the results for Dole on the same two traits. The 1995 results
demonstrate a number of important points, despite the fact that there are not many
observations in this particular pilot study. Costs of information are strongly related to
this certainty measure: respondents who watch the evening television news, who are
male, and who have higher levels of education and political information are all more
certain of each candidate trait. Many of these eects are higher when uncertainty about
Dole's traits are considered. Less information was available to citizens about Dole's
traits than the incumbent President's in 1995, and thus factors that reduce the cost of
information would be expected to have a greater eect when information is scarce. One
interesting result that emerges in Table 3 is the high level of reported certainty among
minority respondents, contrary to our expectations. High levels of minority support
for Democratic candidates is likely introducing some degree of endogeneity into these
estimates; minority respondents who have already formed a candidate preference would
thus be more likely to be subjectively certain of the relative merits of the candidates.
However, the same pattern does not emerge when strong partisans are considered, as the
eect of partisanship on uncertainty is weak.
Tables 3 and 4 go here
In Table 4 we provide similar estimates from the 1996 NES data, presenting the two
trait certainty responses for Clinton, then Dole, and last Perot. Costs of information once
again emerge as a key determinant of uncertainty about candidate traits, and with the
additional observations available in the 1996 NES study, statistically signicant patterns
begin to emerge. Television news exposure, education and chronic information all reduce
the level of uncertainty about the traits of all three candidates in a statistically signicant
way. Strength of partisanship also contributes to the reduction of uncertainty for the two
major party candidates, but not Perot. As in 1995, women are less certain of the trait
attributes of the candidates. Finally, minorities enjoy more certainty when Clinton's
traits are considered, but in a return to the hypothesized relationship between costs of
information and certainty, are more uncertain when considering the traits of Dole and
Perot.
The strong relationship revealed between costs of information and uncertainty about
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candidate trait attributes in the above analysis gives some condence that the direct
measures of uncertainty examined here do capture the uncertainty that respondents have
about candidate personality traits. With a valid measure of respondent uncertainty
established it is now possible to test how individual uncertainty about candidate traits
aects candidate evaluations.
3 Trait Uncertainty and Candidate Evaluation
Previous research has established that voter uncertainty about the issue positions of
candidates both reduces the use of issues in candidate evaluations and has a negative
impact on candidate evaluations. Our hypothesis is that uncertainty about the personal-
ity traits of candidates will have the same impact on candidate evaluations. We employ
a straightforward model of candidate evaluation to test the eect of uncertainty about
candidate traits on evaluations of that candidate. The dependent variable, or the overall
measure of candidate evaluation, is the feeling thermometer rating of each candidate by
the survey respondent. This rating is a scale from 0 to 100, with higher numbers in-
dicating higher evaluations of the candidate (a greater feeling of \warmth" towards the
candidate). As independent control variables we include measures of each respondent's
ideology and partisanship. The ideology variable is a seven point scale, coded so that
higher numbers indicate a more conservative respondent, while lower numbers indicate
a more liberal respondent. The partisanship variable is also a seven point scale, coded
so that higher numbers indicate stronger identication with the Republican party, while
lower numbers indicate stronger identication with the Democratic party (the midpoint
indicates an Independent). We expect the ideology and partisanship variables to take
on a negative sign for the Democratic candidate (Clinton), and a positive sign for the
Republican candidate (Dole). These variables are not expected to have an eect on the
Independent candidate (Perot).
Three independent variables are included to test the hypothesis that uncertainty
about candidate trait attributes will aect candidate evaluations. The rst variable is
the independent eect of each of the two candidate traits for which we have certainty
measures for in each NES study. This variable is coded as a one if the respondent feels
the named trait ts the candidate \extremely well", two if the response is \quite well",
three if \not very well", and four if the response is \not well at all". We expect the
coeÆcient on this variable to have a negative sign, as all of the traits included in the
regressions were favorable traits, and a candidate who is perceived to hold one of these
traits could expect more favorable evaluations. The second variable is the independent
eect of the respondent's uncertainty about each trait, coded as in the previous section.
This variable tests our hypothesis that uncertainty about candidate personality traits will
reduce the overall evaluation of that candidate. Thus we expect a negative coeÆcient
for this variable. The third variable is the interactive eect between the candidate trait
and the respondent's uncertainty about this trait. This variable measures how the use of
candidate personality traits in candidate evaluations changes with uncertainty, and tests
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our hypothesis that uncertainty about a candidate's personality trait will reduce the use
of that trait in evaluations of that candidate. We expect this interaction coeÆcient to be
positive. The intuition for this can be developed using the following example. Assume
that the model is a simple linear equation:
Y =  
1
U   
2
T + 
3
U  T (1)
If we want to know how uncertainty mitigates the eects of the trait (T ) on the evaluation
(Y ), we take the partial derivative of the evaluation with respect to the trait:
@Y
@T
=  
2
+ 
3
U (2)
Let's assume that 
2
= 12 and that 
3
= 4. With these hypothetical values, when an
individual is certain about the trait (U = 1), the expression in Equation 2 equals -8;
however when the individual is uncertain about the trait (U = 3), then the expression
in Equation 2 equals 0. Thus, for the uncertain person the eect of the trait on the
evaluation is zero, while for the certain person the eect is non{zero. Finding a positive
coeÆcient on this variable will conrm our hypothesis that uncertainty about candidate
personality traits reduces the use of these traits in candidate evaluations. We present
the results of these models in Tables 5 (1995) and 6 (1996).
Tables 5 and 6 go here
We begin with the results from the 1995 NES Pilot Study. The evaluation model ts
the data quite well for Clinton (adjusted R
2
of .68) but not as well for Dole (adjusted R
2
of .45). The two control variables (partisanship and ideology) perform as expected, with
conservatives and Republicans tending to evaluate Dole more favorably, and liberals and
Democrats tending to evaluate Clinton more favorably. Both partisanship and ideology
have the predicted signs, and have statistically signicant eects in the Clinton model,
while only partisanship has a statistically signicant eect in the Dole model. Although
the constant in the Clinton model is much higher than in the Dole model, this does not
indicate that Clinton had a large edge in respondent evaluations; all else equal, both
candidates receive similar evaluations
6
. The dierence in constants is a result of the
scaling of the ideology and partisanship variables.
Respondent opinions about the traits of the candidates have a very strong eect on
their evaluations of the candidates, as hypothesized. For both \morality" and \strong
leadership", a candidate who a respondent feels is lacking one or both of these traits is
evaluated far less favorably than by those respondents who believe that the candidate
possesses these traits. The eects of these variables on candidate evaluations are large
and statistically signicant across both traits and both candidates. The coeÆcient on
\strong leadership" for Clinton is especially large (about twice the value of the other trait
coeÆcients), indicating that this personality trait was especially important in respondent
evaluations of Clinton. The 1995 NES Pilot study was conducted primarily in October of
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that year, after Dole had declared his candidacy but before the wide national exposure
of the primary season in early 1996. Even though Dole had been the Republican leader
in the Senate for the past eleven years, respondent evaluations of his leadership did
not carry as much weight as they did for the incumbent President. In contrast, the
leadership abilities of Clinton were much more salient at the time of the Pilot study, as
the Oklahoma City bombing in April and the looming crisis in Bosnia brought the issue
of Presidential leadership to the fore. Respondent opinions about Clinton's leadership
in these and other crises obviously had a greater impact on evaluations of Clinton than
opinions about Dole's eectiveness in the Senate had upon evaluations of Dole.
Uncertainty about candidate traits also has the hypothesized eect on evaluations
of the candidate, although the eect of respondent uncertainty about their opinions of
candidate traits is generally not as strong as the opinions themselves. The estimated
coeÆcients for uncertainty about candidate traits are always negative, but are statisti-
cally signicant only for Clinton on \strong leadership". Again, the prominent role of
leadership in evaluations of the incumbent President emerges, as seen by the large coef-
cient on respondent certainty of Clinton's leadership traits. Overall, uncertainty about
personality traits has a strong eect on candidate evaluations; an increase in uncertainty
about a trait of one point translates into anywhere from a ve to 24 point drop in the
thermometer score for that candidate. This conrms our hypothesis that uncertainty
about candidate traits will negatively impact evaluations of that candidate. Finally, the
estimated coeÆcient for the interaction between uncertainty and trait evaluations also
takes on the hypothesized sign. Positive in all instances, the interaction coeÆcient is
statistically signicant in all but one case. This indicates that respondents who were
certain of their perceptions of a candidate's traits were more likely to use them in their
evaluations of that candidate, as hypothesized.
The results from the 1996 NES Study are given in Table 6. Again, the regression model
ts quite well for Clinton, moderately well for Dole, and less well for Perot. The control
variable exhibit the same pattern observed in the regressions for 1995, with Democrats
and liberals evaluating Clinton more favorably, and Republicans and conservatives eval-
uating Dole more favorably. Ideology had little eect on evaluations of Perot, but he did
enjoy slightly more favorable evaluations from Democrats.
Once again the trait coeÆcients are negative and statistically signicant across all
candidates and traits. Morality now emerges as the more important trait in evaluations
of all candidates, in contrast to 1995. This is a direct result of the emphasis placed
on \character" by the Dole campaign. Throughout the general election campaign Dole
consistently attacked Clinton's morality, focusing attention on the Whitewater scandal
and possible illegal campaign contributions from foreign interests, among other ethical
concerns. Perot also questioned Clinton's moral standing, and as a result the issue of
Presidential character came to have a large impact on evaluations of the candidates.
Uncertainty about trait evaluations was also a negative factor in all instances, and
signicant for morality (and for \gets things done" in the case of Clinton). Uncertainty
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about Clinton's morality had an especially large impact on evaluations of Clinton; his
refusal to answer the ethical charges leveled by Dole and Perot not doubt contributed
further to this uncertainty. The eects of uncertainty on candidate evaluations are strong;
a one point increase in uncertainty leads to a drop in a candidate's thermometer score
that ranges from 2 to 13 points. Finally, the interaction terms are all positive, and four
of six attain statistical signicance.
The interactive eects presented in these models are sometimes diÆcult to ascertain
by looking at regression coeÆcients, so to enhance the interpretation of these results we
present them graphically in Figures 1 through 5. What we have done here is graph
the relationship between each candidate trait, voter uncertainty about the trait, and
the overall candidate evaluation. We give this graphical presentation of the interaction
between uncertainty and trait evaluations for: Clinton, 1995, in Figure 1; Dole, 1995, in
Figure 2; Clinton, 1996, in Figure 3; Dole, 1996, in Figure 4; Perot, 1996, in Figure 5.
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Figures 1 through 5 go here
In each of these ve gures, we plot the interactive eects of trait evaluations and
uncertainty by showing three lines, one line for each level of uncertainty. In each of
the gures, the downward slope of these lines indicates that those who rate each polit-
ical gure higher on each trait scale are also more positive in their general evaluation
of the political gure. For example, in Figure 1, an individual who was certain about
their assessment of Clinton's leadership skills, and who thought that Clinton had strong
leadership skills (placing Clinton at 1.0 on this scale), would have given Clinton a ther-
mometer ranking of slightly over 90 on the 100 point scale. Conversely, an individual
who was certain about Clinton's leadership skills, but who thought that Clinton did not
at all have such skills, would have rated Clinton at less that 50 on the 100 point scale.
The second important result highlighted in these ve gures is a clear demonstration
of the strength of the interaction between uncertainty and traits evaluations. In Figure
1, we see in the top panel (Clinton as a strong leader) that there is a very strong impact
of this trait perception on overall Clinton evaluations among the certain respondents (an
approximately 50 point change on the 100 point thermometer scale) as we go from high to
low on the trait scale. On the other hand, for uncertain individuals there is virtually no
change in the impact of this trait perception on overall Clinton evaluations, as witnessed
by the fact that the line for the uncertain individuals is virtually at. In the bottom
panel, though, there is a much weaker interactive relationship, as is easily seen by the
much smaller dierence between the overall impact of morality as a Clinton attribute for
certain respondents relative to uncertain respondents.
In Figure 2, which examines the same two trait perceptions, but for Bob Dole in the
1995 NES Pilot Study, we see that respondent uncertainty plays a relatively strong role
in determining how strongly both trait attributes inuence overall Dole evaluations. In
the top panel (Dole as a strong leader), we see that for those certain of their assessment of
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Dole's leadership skills, there was a possible 30 point change on the thermometer scale if
we could move the respondent's perception from high to low on this trait attribute. The
same comparison for uncertain respondents would produce only about a 5 point change
on the Dole thermometer scale. Furthermore, similar results are seen in the bottom panel
(Dole morality), but here the eect for uncertain respondents is slightly higher, being
just over 10 points on the thermometer scale.
In Figures 3-5, which provide identical graphs for Clinton, Dole, and Perot traits (gets
things done and morality), but from the 1996 NES, we see results which are quite similar
to those presented from 1995. First, again the slopes of all of these lines are negative,
showing the consistent eect of these trait perceptions on candidate evaluations. Second,
we see for each trait and for each candidate that there is some divergence in the eects of
each particular trait perception on candidate evaluation for dierent levels of respondent
uncertainty. Third, and most interesting, is the consistent nding that the interactive
eect of uncertainty and trait perceptions is greatest for perceptions of each candidate's
morality, and is much lower for perceptions of each candidate's ability to get things done.
For example, in Figure 3 we see that for certain respondents there was approximately a
30 point dierence in the interactive eect of gets things done for Clinton evaluations and
a 40 point dierence in the interactive eect of morality. But for uncertain respondents,
the same interactive eects are approximately 15 points for whether Clinton gets things
done, and almost 10 points for whether Clinton is moral. Thus, while the relative impact
of gets things done is twice as large for certain relative to uncertain respondents, the
same relative impact is about four times larger for morality. This same basic relationship
is seen in each gure.
What could produce this consistent nding from the 1996 election? Returning to
Table 6 we see that respondent certainty about Dole and Perot's ability to get things
done, and the interactive eect between this certainty and the trait perception itself, are
much smaller than the similar estimates for the morality perception and the respondent's
certainty about the candidate's morality. The coeÆcients for gets things done, and the
uncertainty for that trait, are also insignicant for Dole and Perot. In the end, the 1996
presidential election campaign did not signicantly revolve around the basic competence
of the major party candidates | Clinton had been a very eective president in terms of
getting legislation passed, especially in the last two years of his rst term, while Dole's
long leadership term in the U.S. Senate certainly certied him as someone who could
get things done. But, with the consistent claims of scandals in the White House, and in
Arkansas before he was President, and with the unveiling of signicant campaign nance
abuses by the Democratic party, it seems to have been the case that the morality of the
candidates became the signicant trait attribute in this campaign.
11
4 Discussion and Conclusions
The results from the analysis of the 1995 and 1996 data provide strong support for the
fundamental arguments of this paper. We nd systematic evidence which shows that
voters are not certain about their trait evaluations of political candidates, just as they
are not certain about the issue positions of these same candidates. This aects candidate
evaluations in two ways. First, for respondents who are uncertain about a particular
candidate trait, that trait matters less in their evaluation of the candidate than for
a respondent who was certain about a particular candidate trait. Second, respondent
uncertainty about a particular candidate's traits reduces the overall evaluation of that
candidate by the respondent. These results parallel those uncovered when examining
candidate issue positions (Alvarez 1997, Bartels 1986, Franklin 1991).
Further, we demonstrated that in the regression models we presented using the 1996
NES data, that there was a systematic nding | assessments of each candidate's morality
were much more strongly related to overall evaluations than were assessments of whether
the candidates are able to get things done. This contrasts with the ndings of a year
earlier, where leadership abilities were the most powerful inuence on evaluations of
Clinton. Obviously, Dole's eorts during the general election campaign to make an issue
of \character" succeeded in raising doubts about Clinton's morality.
Our research sheds light on two important debates in the literature about the role
of candidate trait assessments in the overall process of candidate evaluation. First, our
research supports the recent ndings of Funk (1997), who demonstrated that political
information or expertise plays a signicant role in facilitating the use of trait attributes
in candidate evaluation, contrary to the earlier results of Rahn et al. (1990). It is quite
clear from our results that there exists substantial heterogeneity in the certainty of voter
evaluations of candidate traits and that these dierences in the electorate impact the
strength with which these traits factor into voter evaluations of candidates. But secondly,
our results paint a much more complicated picture of whether some trait dimensions are
more useful to voters, especially the politically informed, in developing their evaluations of
candidates. Most studies have shown that competence and leadership skills are typically
stronger predictors of vote choice than personal attributes of candidates (Funk 1997;
Kinder 1986; Markus 1982; Miller 1990; Miller et al. 1986; Rahn et al. 1990); Funk
(1997) argued that this was especially true for politically informed individuals. But our
results showed that while leadership was a stronger predictor of candidate preference in
the 1995 data, especially among the certain voters, we found the reverse in the 1996 data.
Thus, it seems that political context plays a role in determining when some candidate
traits might be more politically relevant than others. In the future, an important research
agenda will be to examine the relationship between direct measures of candidate trait
uncertainty and the information ows during presidential campaigns, in order to trace
the relationship between the dynamics of campaign context and voter information about
candidates.
The direct measures of uncertainty examined in this paper showed themselves to be
12
valid indicators of the uncertainty felt by respondents when considering the traits of can-
didates. With the success enjoyed by this direct measure here and elsewhere (Alvarez
and Franklin 1994), we expect to see further applications of this type of direct measure in
the study of voter uncertainty. The eects of the subjective uncertainty that the direct
measure captures were clearly reected in evaluations of candidates. It is increasingly
apparent to those who study voter behavior in elections that citizens grapple with uncer-
tainty when faced with even the most basic political choices. While most research in this
area has focused on the impact that uncertainty has had on the ability of the public to
undertake \issue voting", this analysis reveals that even information as easily understood
as candidate personality traits comes at a price. Thus, even the \low{information cues"
that voters are thought to rely on when the cost of issue information is too high are
subject to uncertainty.
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Notes
1
The empirical support for this speculation is decidedly mixed. Alvarez (1997) found \Although the
results are mixed, it generally appears that contrary to my expectations, voters who are less certain of
the policy positions of the candidates do not appear to turn to partisan cues in their voting decision to
a greater extent than relatively certain voters" (p. 152).
2
This literature is surveyed in Alvarez 1997
3
Throughout this paper we will use the terms uncertainty and certainty interchangeably when talking
about voter information about issues and traits; generally we will refer to the direct survey questions
about the information of voters about these aspects of candidate evaluation as certainty questions.
4
Unfortunately the NES decided to remove some Perot questions during the middle of the 1996
study; the Perot morality items were removed from the survey instrument in late September, 1996. This
means that roughly half of the pre{election sample were asked this item.
5
The details of the coding of these independent variables is as follows. Television is coded as a one if
the individual watches the nightly news, and zero otherwise. Gender is coded one for women and zero for
men, while race is coded one for minorities and zero for whites. Chronic information is a four point scale
constructed from correct and incorrect responses by the individual to four factual political questions,
with higher numbers indicating a larger number of correct answers. Education is a four point scale with
higher numbers indicating greater educational attainment. The strength of partisanship variable is a
four point scale, with higher numbers indicating stronger self reported identication with a political
party.
6
For example, if a moderate Independent (a four on both the ideology and partisanship scales)
evaluated both Clinton and Dole at a \2" for both traits, and also stated that certainty about those
traits was also a \2", then the predicted thermometer score for Clinton is 65.00, and the predicted
thermometer score for Dole is 62.43, a dierence of less than ve points.
7
To produce these gures we simply used the regression coeÆcients presented in Tables 5 and 6.
We produced predicted values for the candidate's overall evaluation by multiplying these coeÆcients by
various values of the trait and uncertainty variables. All other variables in the equation were generally
set to their midpoints and multiplied by the appropriate coeÆcient, although it is important to note
that the values of these other variables have no impact on what is substantively interesting; the slopes
of the lines in Figures 1-5.
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Table 1: Respondent Certainty for Candidate Traits (1995 Pilot)
Clinton Traits Certainty
Provides Strong Leadership Moral
Response N % N %
Very 162 33.33 153 31.48
Pretty 263 54.12 255 52.47
Not Very 55 11.32 57 11.73
DK 3 0.62 2 0.41
NA 0 0.00 0 0.00
INAP 3 0.62 19 3.91
Dole Traits Certainty
Provides Strong Leadership Moral
Response N % N %
Very 111 22.84 101 20.78
Pretty 260 53.50 253 52.06
Not Very 74 15.23 73 15.02
DK 1 0.21 0 0.00
NA 1 0.21 0 0.00
INAP 39 8.02 59 12.14
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Table 2: Respondent Certainty for Candidate Traits (1996 NES)
Clinton Traits Certainty
Gets Things Done Moral
Response N % N %
Very 462 26.95 546 31.86
Pretty 957 55.83 797 46.50
Not Very 273 15.93 333 19.43
DK 2 0.12 0 0.00
NA 1 0.06 1 0.06
INAP 19 1.11 37 2.16
Dole Traits Certainty
Gets Things Done Moral
Response N % N %
Very 366 21.35 446 26.02
Pretty 828 48.31 831 48.48
Not Very 388 22.64 339 19.78
DK 1 0.06 1 0.06
NA 1 0.06 1 0.06
INAP 130 7.58 96 5.60
Perot Traits Certainty
Gets Things Done Moral y
Response N % N %
Very 410 23.92 107 16.72
Pretty 761 44.40 246 38.44
Not Very 355 20.71 193 30.16
DK 0 0.00 0 0.0
NA 2 0.12 0 0.0
INAP 186 10.85 94 14.69
y The Perot question on Morality was removed from the 1996 NES study on September
25, 1996. Sample size for this question only reects responses before that date.
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Table 3: Ordered Probit Models of Trait Certainty (1995 Pilot Study)
Independent Clinton Clinton Dole Dole
Variables Leadership Moral Leadership Moral
Watches News -0.02 -0.02 -0.04y -0.07**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Race -0.02 0.01 -0.13* -0.11y
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Gender 0.36** 0.30** 0.25* 0.04
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Education -0.05 -0.07 -0.12y -0.16*
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Information -0.11* -0.00 -0.11* -0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Strength PID 0.00 0.04 -0.00 -0.13*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)

1
-0.64 -0.42 -1.25 -1.93
(0.23) (0.23) (0.25) (0.26)

2
1.03 1.22 0.47 -0.16
(0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
N 469 454 434 419

2
23.56** 11.21y 28.30** 29.99**
Note: y denotes estimates signicant at p=0.10, * denotes estimates signicant at
p=0.05, and ** denotes estimates signicant at p=0.01, all two-tailed tests. Standard
errors in parenthesis.
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Table 4: Ordered Probit Models of Trait Certainty (NES 1996)
Independent Clinton Clinton Dole Dole Perot Perot
Variables Moral Get Things Done Moral Get Things Done Moral Get Things Done
Watches News -0.05** -0.05** -0.07** -0.07** -0.06** -0.05**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Race -0.04 -0.22* 0.22* 0.19* 0.56** -0.03
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.18) (0.09)
Gender 0.18** 0.22** 0.19** 0.26** 0.19y 0.27**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06)
Education -0.02 0.04 -0.08* -0.03 0.08 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
Information -0.05* -0.05* -0.11** -0.08** -0.03 -0.08**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Strength PID -0.12** -0.15** -0.10** -0.16** -0.06 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)

1
-1.03 -1.14 -1.46 -1.60 -0.94 -0.86
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.21) (0.13)

2
0.30 0.51 0.02 -0.09 0.33 0.53
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.21) (0.13)
N 1652 1666 1595 1562 542 1509

2
65.44** 91.07** 137.17** 134.91** 28.99** 67.50**
Note: y denotes estimates signicant at p=0.10, * denotes estimates signicant at p=0.05, and **
denotes estimates signicant at p=0.01, all two-tailed tests. Standard errors in parenthesis. See
Table 2 for explanation of low N in Perot Moral.
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Table 5: Eects of Traits and Certainty on Candidate Evaluations, 1995
Clinton Dole
Constant 172.94** 105.27**
(11.58) (10.79)
PID -3.45** 2.43**
(0.51) (0.49)
Ideology -1.80* 0.30
(0.70) (0.70)
Moral -11.23** -13.86**
(3.25) (3.31)
Strong -25.98** -12.93**
Leadership (3.73) (3.57)
Certainty -4.59 -7.08
Moral (5.14) (4.77)
Certainty -24.47** -5.25
SL (6.10) (5.11)
Moral x 2.92y 2.82
Cert. Moral (1.71) (1.84)
SL x 8.48** 3.30y
Cert. SL (1.97) (1.93)
N 313 294
Adj. R
2
.68 .45
Note: y denotes estimates signicant at p=.10, * denotes estimates signicant at
p=.05, and ** denotes estimates signicant at p=0.01, all two-tailed tests. Standard
errors in parenthesis.
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Table 6: Eects of Traits and Certainty on Candidate Evaluations, 1996
Clinton Dole Perot
Constant 159.74** 75.15** 98.14**
(6.08) (5.72) (10.84)
PID -4.47** 3.35** -1.11**
(0.30) (0.29) (0.58)
Ideology -1.82** 3.04** 0.29
(0.42) (0.44) (0.91)
Moral -20.54** -11.92** -19.53**
(1.62) (2.07) (4.08)
Get Things -12.56** -9.16** -7.18**
Done (1.86) (2.11) (3.38)
Certainty -12.71** -6.06** -7.55*
Moral (2.55) (2.36) (4.80)
Certainty -4.42** -2.07 -3.48
GTD (2.64) (2.60) (4.68)
Moral x 5.77** 2.72** 3.76**
Cert. Moral (0.86) (1.09) (1.93)
GTD x 2.19** 0.94 1.76
Cert. GTD (1.00) (1.05) (1.80)
N 1297 1219 405
Adj. R
2
.69 .48 .23
Note: y denotes estimates signicant at p=0.10, * denotes estimates signicant at
p=0.05, and ** denotes estimates signicant at p=0.01, all two-tailed tests. Standard
errors in parenthesis.
23
••
•
•
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
50
60
70
80
90
+
+
+
+
50
60
70
80
90
? ? ? ?
Clinton Strong Leader
Cl
in
to
n 
Ev
al
ua
tio
n
50
60
70
80
90 • Certain
+ Somewhat
? Uncertain
•
•
•
•
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
50
60
70
80
90
+
+
+
+
50
60
70
80
90
? ?
? ?
Clinton Morality
Cl
in
to
n 
Ev
al
ua
tio
n
50
60
70
80
90 • Certain
+ Somewhat
? Uncertain
Figure 1: Clinton, 1995
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Figure 2: Dole, 1995
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Figure 3: Clinton, 1996
26
••
•
•
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
30
40
50
60
+
+
+
+
30
40
50
60
?
?
?
?
Dole Gets Things Done
D
ol
e 
Ev
al
ua
tio
n
30
40
50
60
• Certain
+ Somewhat
? Uncertain
•
•
•
•
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
30
40
50
60
+
+
+
+
30
40
50
60
?
?
?
?
Dole Morality
D
ol
e 
Ev
al
ua
tio
n
30
40
50
60
• Certain
+ Somewhat
? Uncertain
Figure 4: Dole, 1996
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Figure 5: Perot, 1996
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